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1. Introduction 
 
In various policy domains, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe CEE) have 
experienced institutional transformations with intensity almost unknown to other countries. 
This undoubtedly holds true for the field of social policy as well. This paper is the first of a 
series of papers in which I try to explain the development of social policies in the CEE 
countries from a wide variety of domestic and international characteristics. In this paper, I 
focus on the role of civil society – more specifically the role of trade unions – in the reform 
of social policies in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  
Trade unions are by far the largest organizations of civil society in the post-communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In most of these countries, after the fall of the 
communist regimes new trade unions have been created in addition to the –reformed- 
communist trade unions. Moreover, extensive institutional reforms regarding industrial 
relations have been implemented. A tripartite social dialogue in which general social 
economic topics are discussed, is now common practice in almost every country in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE). Trade unions have regained considerable power after the 
communist transition, although in all countries these unions are confronted with declining 
membership figures. Main reasons for this decline are the structural change in employment 
from industry (with a high level of unionization) to commercial services, and the rise of 
unemployment (unemployed usually do not join trade unions). Despite these general 
tendencies, quite some variation in the role and characteristics of trade unions between the 
CEE countries can be observed. This paper focuses on the effects of the variations in the 
role and characteristics of trade unions on social policy reform. 
 
The early years of transformation in most Central and Eastern European countries brought 
economic crises unlike anything experienced under socialism. Inflation, unemployment and 
poverty created an urgent need for forms of social protection (Fultz, 2002: 1). The new 
governments’ legitimacy depended to a large extent on its ability to provide adequate social 
policy in answer to these problems. The necessity to deal with the consequences of 
unemployment explains the introduction of unemployment and early retirement schemes in 
the CEE countries.  
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As the economies of the Central and Eastern European countries stabilized in the second 
half of the 1990s, virtually all governments set about the task of restructuring social security. 
The earlier emergency measures needed to be restructured because of the rising costs, and 
because of the necessity to adapt some features of the pretransition scheme to the new needs 
of people in market economies (Fultz, 2002: 1-2).  
 
 
Whereas ‘third sector’ and ‘civil society’ are topics that draw a great deal of attention in the 
analysis of post-communist transitions, the role of trade unions is covered less extensively. 
This is surprising on two grounds. First, in all post-communist states trade unions are by far 
the largest organizations in civil society. Second, given the “twin demands of democratisation 
and marketisation in post-communist states and the position of unions as potentially 
important actors in both political and economic arenas, one would think they would be 
important players in the political economy of post communist reform” (Kubicek, 2002: 603). 
So in section 2, I start with a brief description of ‘civil society’ and will try to analyze to what 
extent trade unions fit in this general description. In section 3, assumptions on the role of 
trade unions in processes of welfare reform are formulated. Section 4 presents the 
characteristics of the trade unions in seven CEE countries. The selection of these countries is 
based on the date of their (prospective) EU-admittance. In section 5, the development of 
wages in these seven countries is analyzed. Section 6 describes a few topics that are situated 
‘in the heart’ of most welfare reform processes: pension reform, employers’ and employees’ 
contributions to social insurances, and general social expenditures. Section 7 analyzes the 
impact of trade unions’ characteristics on these reforms. Finally, in section 8 I will end with 
some general remarks on the impact of European social policy on the development and 
reform of the welfare state in the CEE countries.      
 
 
2. Trade unions as third sector organizations 
 
Civil society is a dominant theme in post-communist politics. Civil society played an 
important role in bringing down communist regimes, and is meant to serve as a foundation 
for a new democratic order (Kubicek, 2002: 603). This expectation is based on the 
Tocquevillian conception of civil society as a social sphere distinct from the family, market 
and the state, and composed of interdependent, voluntary organizations and networks of 
citizens. By fostering values of citizenship, community and political participation among the 
population and by creating structures to prevent the emergence of authoritarian state power, 
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civil society positively contributes to democracy in transitional countries (Kubicek, 2002: 
603).  
 
An important theme in the growing literature on civil society, is the theme of the institutional 
factor that affect the relative strength of civil society in different countries. According to 
Kramer (1990: 260), no consistent set of factors has yet been identified which can explain the 
presence of nonprofit organizations in widely different countries - democratic and 
totalitarian, highly centralized or decentralized regimes, religiously heterogeneous or 
homogeneous, etc.; or the particular mix between government, the market, and nonprofit 
organizations in different fields of service. Nor have any theories been proposed to account 
for the origin, development, and change over time of the sector or its components in relation 
to government (Kramer, 1990: 260).  
 
A general but simple line of argument that can be found in literature is that there is a non-
profit sector because both state and market fail in providing collective, categorical goods and 
services. According to Kramer (1990: 256) certainly is right when he argues that the reasons 
why nonprofit organizations are responsible for performing certain activities can vary across 
countries: “Voluntary agencies are used by government because, as in the United Kingdom, 
the Local Authority Social Service Departments may not have appropriate, specialized or 
sufficient resources; or because, as in Holland, they are, for historical and religio-political 
reasons, the providers of first choice, or, for more pragmatic reasons, in the United States 
and Israel they may provide an economical, flexible services which is often a means of 
avoiding bureaucratic or budgetary constraints” (Kramer, 1990: 256).  
 
However, at a general level, several institutional factors can be identified that seem to 
influence the development of third sector organizations in a country. According to Salamon 
and Anheier (1996: 9) three sets of factors seem to be especially important in shaping the 
scope and scale of the nonprofit sector in a country: 
1. Heterogeneity. The existence of a nonprofit sector can be considered as a result of 
inherent limitations of both market and state in providing collective goods. Because of 
their collective nature, such goods are generally underproduced by the market system. 
According to classical economic theory, the existence of such collective goods explains 
why government is needed in a market economy. However, the more diverse the 
population, the more difficult it is for people to agree on what collective goods should be 
provided. The result will be unsatisfied demand for collective goods on the part of 
different segments of the population. The function of the nonprofit sector is to meet this 
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unsatisfied demand for collective goods. The greater the diversity of the population, the 
greater the size of the nonprofit sector (Salamon & Anheier, 1996: 9-10). 
2. Scope of the welfare state. The greater the scope of the welfare state in a country, the 
less unsatisfied demand for collective goods remains. So the number of nonprofit sector 
organizations and project is expected to be lower in more elaborate welfare states.  
3. Historical traditions. Various historical en religious traditions can encourage or 
discourage the formation of nonprofit sector organizations. For instance, in the 
Netherlands a strong tradition of subsidiarity growing out of Christian social thought has 
offered quite a hospital clime for the growth of nonprofit institutions. 
 
According to Johns (2002), trade unions are among the earliest manifestations of civil 
society, they are original NGOs. They exist as a collection of individuals trying to solve 
individual and collective problems. However, compared with some other civil society 
organizations, they have become incorporated in the system of government, and have 
become an inseparable part of the welfare state. Moreover, trade unions always face the 
dilemma of servicing their own members and contributing to the general interest.  
 
Kubicek (2002) argues that trade unions’ role in post-communist social policy making has 
been remarkably limited, given their previous role in helping bring down communist 
governments, their sheer size, and the socio-economic disaster that has accompanied the 
move to the market. However, it is important to take into account the differences between 
the various CEE countries with regard to the role in the transformation, their institutional 
position and their performance. It has been more or less common practice to refer to ‘the 
CEE countries’ as if no differences between these countries exist. Although these groups 
share a set of common characteristics – merely but not exclusively based on their shared 
communist past – there is considerable ‘within group’ variety as well. According to Orenstein 
and Wikens, several classifications have been made (Orenstein and Wilkens, 2001). The 
Worldbank distinguishes between the ‘European’ category and the ‘Eurasian’ category. The 
European group includes East-Central European countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and the  and Slovenia), the more successful Balkan and 
former Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania and Bulgaria) and 
the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia). The Eurasian group consists of the former 
Soviet Republics excluding the Baltic states and including Albania (Worldbank, 2000). 
According to Boeri, three groups of CEE countries can be distinguished, based on their 
likely date of accession in 2000: Group 1 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland. and 
 4
Slovenia), Group 2 (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and the Slovak Republic), and 
Group 3 (Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine) (Boeri, 2000).  
 
In 2004, this categorization seems somewhat outdated, but the date of admission to the 
European Union remains a good indicator of similarities and dissimilarities in the stage of a 
country’s development. In this paper, I will focus on the role of trade unions in welfare 
reform in three groups of countries. The first group consists of the countries that have been 
admitted to the European Union on 1 May 2004. The second group represents countries that 
are scheduled to admit in 2007. The final group consists of countries for which no admission 
date has been scheduled yet. Out of the first group, three countries will be analyzed. Out of 
the second and third group, two countries will be analyzed. Therefore, this paper focuses on 
Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia (group 1), Bulgaria and Romania (group 2), Croatia and 
Moldova (group 3).1  
 
 
3.  Trade unions and welfare reform 
 
In their book ‘Varieties of Capitalism’. Hall and Soskice summarize the dominant perspective 
on trade unions’ roles in welfare reform. They state that in the age of globalization, 
governments are “under increasing pressure from business to alter their regulatory 
frameworks so as to lower domestic labor costs, reduce rates of taxation, and expand internal 
markets via deregulation. What resistance there is to such steps will come from trade unions, 
seeking to protect the wages of their members (...). The precise effects that each nations 
suffers will thus be determined by the amount of political resistance that labor and the left 
can mount to proposals for change” (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In addition, Thelen (2001) 
states in the same volume that contemporary changes in the welfare state are considered as 
part of a universal move on the part of employers to deregulate labor relations. Cross-
national differences in outcomes are attributed primarily to the differing capacities of unions 
to resist these changes. Thus, in the dominant perspective, trade unions are presumed to 
favor welfare state expansion and to try to block processes of welfare reform. Businesses and 
business associations are supposed to generally oppose welfare state expansion and support 
all reforms that cut back the welfare state (Hall and Soskice, 2001). With regard to the CEE 
                                                   
1 In this paper it will become clear that for the third group hardly any comparable data are available. In a 
further stage of this project, this will be countered by the collection of original data in these countries. For 
this moment however, we will need to accept any missing data.   
 5
countries, for instance Kubicek (2002) takes this perspective. He states that (...) “unions are 
to put it mildly, another matter, groups that need to be beaten or subdued if democratic 
consolidation and marketisation are to have a chance” (Kubicek, 2002).  
 
Following the ‘varieties of capitalism approach’, Thelen argues that recent trends in industrial 
relations and welfare state development are better captured by distinguishing different types 
of political-economic systems. To be able to understand trade unions’ roles in welfare 
reform, we need to explore the different institutional arrangements and behavioral logics for 
trade unions in different political-economic systems (Thelen, 2001). In a similar way, Mares 
(2001) criticizes the dominant perspective on the role of business in welfare state 
development and reform. She argues that business groups have played key roles in the 
development of social policy for over a century (Mares, 2001). Social policies can improve the 
operation of labor markets from the perspective of the firm. “Unemployment benefits with 
high replacement rates, for instance, can improve the ability of firms to attract and retain 
pools of labor with high or specific skills. Disability benefits and early retirement benefits can 
allow firms that operate production regimes requiring employee loyalty to release labor 
without violating implicit contracts about long-term employment” (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
 
In the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach, the institutional history of political-economic 
systems is considered as an important feature of the ways these systems operate. However, 
what is striking about the CEE countries that take a central place in this paper, is that their 
institutional histories are comparable to a large extent. For almost half a century, they have 
been under communist regimes. After the spectacular break down of the Berlin Wall and the 
Iron Curtain, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe faced the enormous challenge of 
economic, technological, political and social transition. With respect to the social transition, 
the major challenge was to reform the old communist welfare states to the demands of the 
new, open economies. The communist welfare states consisted of the provision of highly 
subsidized prices on food, housing, transport and basic necessities, guaranteed employment, 
adequate health and education provision (Deacon, 2000).   
 
Despite the common features of the developments in the CEE countries, quite some 
variation in the position of trade unions and – to a lesser extent – business associations, can 
be observed. In this paper, I will try to link the institutional differences regarding the role and 
position of trade unions to the variation in the development of the welfare states that can be 
observed. In the dominant perspective on trade unions’ roles in welfare reform, it would be 
sufficient to analyze the power base of trade unions and business associations in order to 
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explain the process of reform. However, in the more elaborate view that has been developed 
in this section, we also need to incorporate the general institutional system, the ideological 
background and the co-ordination mechanisms in our analysis. Following Brandl and Traxler 
(2004) four competing hypotheses regarding the relation between trade unions and the 
welfare state can be developed (Brandl and Traxler, 2004). 
1. The classical compensatory thesis assumes that macroconcertation of policies requires a 
political exchange of obligations and gratifications between the actors involved. This 
means that the unions obtain compensation in terms of public welfare benefits in 
exchange for wage moderation. Thus, political exchange tends to moderate wages and to 
inflate welfare expenditures; 
2. The revised compensatory thesis argues that successful social pacts combine the ability to 
moderate wages and to cut back the welfare state. Unions’ compensations are side 
payments at best, like the expansion of active labor market policies, taxation, or 
institutional privileges. Negative incentives are also important, in particular the capacity 
of governments to threaten convincingly the unions’ position in the political system; 
3. The additive thesis suggests that wage increases, as fixed by the two sides of industry, may 
cause negative externalities (rising inflation and/or unemployment) on third parties. This 
becomes manifest in a fragmented bargaining system. The opposite, inclusive central 
bargaining, sets an incentive to moderate wage increases, such that possible adverse 
consequences in terms higher inflation, unemployment and taxation can be minimized. 
Decreasing welfare expenditures are considered as a by-product of wage moderation and 
thus add to its overall beneficial effects; 
4. The pressure thesis relates the development of the welfare state to the strength of organized 
labor. The general assumption is that welfare expenditures tend to increase with the 
strength of organized labor.  
 
In the remaining part of this paper, we will see to what extent one or more of these 
hypotheses apply to the relation between welfare reform and the position of trade unions in 
CEE countries.  
 
 
4.  The role of trade unions in CEE Countries 
 
In this section, I will focus on the role of trade unions in seven Central and East European 
Countries. The information that is presented here, comes from existing sources. This also 
explains the limited information on Croatia and Moldova: it appears that little data for these 
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countries are available. In a further stage of this project, the analysis will be extended with 
own data.   
 
The description of the role of trade unions focuses on three topics: a short description of the 
history of the labor movement in each of these countries, an analysis of the development of 
union membership and a short description of the bargaining process.  
 
4.1  A short history of the labor movement in seven CEE Countries  
 
In these qualitative descriptions of the role of trade unions in the selected countries, we are 
looking for variables that could determine differences in trade union performance. For each 
country, I will pay attention to the role of the former communist trade union, the role of the 
labor movement in bringing down the communist system and the relation between the new 
and the old trade union will be covered.    
 
Bulgaria 
Jones (1992) start his description of Bulgarian trade unions before World War II. “In the 
decade before World War II, the dictatorship of Tsar Boris III abolished independent trade 
unions in favor of a single, government-sponsored Bulgarian Workers’ Unions. Als Bulgaria 
emerged from the war under Soviet occupation, communists abolished that union and 
replaced it with a General Workers’ Professional Union. When capitalism was declared illegal 
in 1948, the Dimitrov government united thirteen unions under the Central Council of Trade 
Unions, which endured until 1989 as the single umbrella organization representing Bulgarian 
workers. In 1986 a New Labor Code was introduced which facilitated worker participation. 
Within enterprises, workers were organized into “brigades”, and both brigade leaders and 
enterprise directors were to be elected by workers. This development meant a –albeit minor 
– shift of power from the establishment (and its union-based structure) to the brigade” 
(Jones, 1992).  
 
Almost a year before the fall of Zhivkov, the Independent Labor Federation, Podkrepa, 
organized as a white-collar opposition group inspired by the Polish Solidarity movement. 
When the communist regime was overthrown, the central council began restructuring the 
trade union system, declaring the organization independent of the Bulgarian Communist 
Party and renaming it the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions” (CITU) (US Library 
of Congress). In the early years after the transformation, CITUB was said to hold close ties 
to the communist party, although Jones (1992) argues rightfully that on many occasions 
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CITUB acted independently. However, it was a general strike issued by Prodkepra that, in 
November 1990, led to the fall of the socialist government of Lubanov that had received a 
mandate in the first free elections of 1990 (Jones, 1992).  
 
A coalition government led by Popov succeeded the Lubanov government. This government 
was formed in response to international, IMF-led pressure for decisive economic reforms. 
Popov’s government meant a broadened role for the trade unions and the beginning of 
tripartism in Bulgaria. “Its crowning achievement was the conclusion of the Agreement on 
Social Peace in January 1991, in which trade unions accepted a 30 percent wage cut in 
exchange for improved wage indexation and the institutionalization of a tripartite body (Zic, 
1998). The relations between CITUB and Podkrepa, the two main trade unions, and their 
relations with the political parties and successive governments in the subsequent period were 
complex and chaotic. According to Zic, “during Bulgaria’s turbulent years of postcommunist 
transition, the country’s trade unions became major actors on the national political scene, 
which was polarized between political parties not capable of offering the nation a coherent 
and consistent program of political and economic transition. The unions, despite a deep 
mutual distrust and frequent failure to cooperate, acted decisively to break political 
stalemates and push ineffective governments out of office. The unions stood in staunch 
defense of the more narrow socioeconomic interests of their constituencies, but showed 
ample capability to moderate their demands in support of the stabilization and austerity 
policies of various governments. The unions acted with a reasonable amount of caution and 
restraint, showing a willingness to give new governments a chance before launching major 
protests in response to failing policies. The unions demonstrated general support for needed 
economic reforms, realizing that only comprehensive change can bring about a more 
fundamental improvement for the country” (Zic, 1998). 
 
However, the political landscape in Bulgaria remains dynamic and chaotic. The 2001 election 
were a landslide electoral victory for the party of the former Bulgarian monarch Simeon II 
(Vassilev, 2004). In the autumn of 2003, CITUB and CL Podkrepa held a series of regional 
protest meetings and, together with their sectoral organisations, called a national protest 
demonstration against the economic and social policy of the government led by Simeon II. 
More than 17,000 people expressed their dissatisfaction with the government and asked for 
the resignation of the cabinet. According to the organizers, this was the largest protest held 
by the two trade union confederations since the winter of 1996. This demonstrates the 
ongoing concern of the Bulgarian trade unions with matters of general economic and social 
policy, despite the falling membership figures as demonstrated in table 1 (Neykov, 2004).  
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Table 1 Trade unions in Bulgaria 
 1993 1998 2003 Change 1993-2003 
CITUB 1,426,000 608,000 390,000 -72.7% 
CL Podkrepa 500,000 155,000 109,000 -78.2% 
Other trade unions 266.000 15.000 11.000 -95.9% 
Source: (Carley, 2003) 
 
Czech Republic 
According to Cook (1995), labor relation in the Czech Republic after the fall of commusism 
have been less conflict-ridden – and unions less influential – than in most other CEE 
countries. In 1990, a reformed union (CSKOS) succeeded the official communist trade 
unions (Cook, 1995). The CSKOS retained the communist trade unions’ property and 
membership rolls, which included 80% of the workforce. The CSKOS split up in December 
1992, leaving in the Czech Republic the Bohemian and Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions. 
“Both before and after the breakup, the Czech unions have pursued a conciliatory strategy, 
bargaining succesfully for an ILO-crafted labor code and engaging in trilateral negotiations 
on wage levels, labor market policy, and so on” (Cook, 1995). Cook also argues that labor 
relations have been relatively peaceful in the Czech Republic partly because the costs of 
reform have been comparatively low.  
 
Moreover, Myant and Smith (1999) argue that the Czech trade union have failed to adapt to 
the changed environment. According to them, there is a mismatch between a vision of a 
unified union movement playing an active role in society, and a structure in which great 
power is given to local organizations that are locked into providing the same services as 
before 1989 and into bargaining over a relatively narrow agenda. This has left Czech unions 
even more vulnerable to a changing environment than trade unions in other countries (Myant 
and Smith, 1999).  
 
Moldova 
The Republic of Moldova occupies most of what has been known as Bessarabia. Moldova's 
location has made it a historic passageway between Asia and southern Europe as well as the 
victim of frequent warfare. Greeks, Romans, Huns, and Bulgars invaded the area, which in 
the 13th century became part of the Mongol empire. An independent Moldovan state 
emerged briefly in the 14th century under celebrated leader Stefan the Great, but 
subsequently fell under Ottoman Turkish rule in the 16th century. 
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In 1940, Romania was forced to cede eastern Moldova to the U.S.S.R., which established the 
Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic by merging the autonomous republic east of the 
Dniester and the annexed Bessarabian portion. Romania sought to regain it by joining with 
Germany in the 1941 attack on the U.S.S.R. Moldova was ceded back to Moscow when 
hostilities between the U.S.S.R. and Romania ceased at the end of World War II. The present 
boundary between Moldova and Romania was established in 1947. Moldova declared 
independence from the Soviet Union on August 27, 1991. 
 
Widespread popular dissatisfaction with the government and the economy, however, led to a 
surprise at the polls, in February 2001. In elections certified by international observers as free 
and fair, Moldova's populace voted overwhelmingly for the communists. The communist 
faction, which had consisted of 40 of Parliament's 101 seats, jumped to 71--a clear majority. 
Communist deputies were then able to elect as president Vladimir Voronin, the leader of 
their faction. Since election, President Voronin has proceeded with President Lucinschi's 
plans to privatize several important state-owned industries, and has even on occasion broken 
with his own party over important issues.  
 
Until 2000, the economic situation has been characterised by extreme poverty and a very 
difficult social situation with problems similar to those of developing countries. Some 
800,000 Moldovans have left the country, most of them coming from the countryside. 
Moldova made steady progress on economic reform in 2001. The macroeconomic situation 
continued to be strong after showing dramatic improvement in 2000. Moldova, however, 
continued to depend on foreign sources, particularly for its energy need. 
 
A 1990 Soviet law and a 1991 Parliamentary decision authorizing formation of social 
organizations provide for independent trade unions. The General Federation of Trade 
Unions succeeded the Soviet trade union system upon Moldovan independence. In late 2000, 
the union split. The Trade Union Confederation of Moldova (TUCM), successor to the 
previous federation, retained 80% of the union members in Moldova, and primarily 
represents agriculture and agricultural processing sector, public services, radio electronics, 
medicine, education, and culture. "Solidaritate" (solidarity), a new organization, includes the 
remaining 20% of unionized workers from industry, transport, telecommunication, 
construction, and social protection. The unions have tried to influence government policy in 
labor issues and been critical of many economic policies. Moldovan labor law, which is based 
on former Soviet legislation, provides for collective bargaining rights.  
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Poland 
“Prior to 1980, nearly all employees of state enterprises belonged to trade unions. Poland, in 
a similar way to other countries of the Soviet bloc, had only one trade union center: The 
Central Council of Trade Unions (CRZZ). Following to major strikes in the Gdansk shipyard 
in August 1980, the Polish trade union movement was transformed to a large extent. The 
government gave its assent to the existence of independent trade unions, which contributed 
to the establishment of NSZZ Solidarnosc, which at least 7 million workers joined. 
Solidarnosc, led by Lech Walesa, was more of a social movement standing in opposition to 
the ruling regime that a trade union” (Gardawski, 2002).  
 
After the announcement of martial law in Poland in December 1981, all trade unions ceased 
to exist. In October 1982, the government adopted an act allowing for the creation of new 
trade unions loyal to the ruling authorities. Unlike the other countries of the Soviet bloc, 
these trade unions in Poland were of an autonomous character, with federal features. In 
January 1984, these new trade unions established a new centre, All-Poland Alliance of Trade 
Unions (OPZZ), assembling over 100 federations. Apart from OPZZ there was an 
underground 'Solidarnosc' organisation, whose membership level was hard to assess. 
 
In January 1989, 'Solidarnosc' was legalised and, in February 1989, negotiations with the 
government began at a 'round table'. In the course of these negotiations, 'Solidarnosc' called 
for the introduction of a social market economy, socialisation (though not privatisation) of 
large enterprises, and an extension of workers' 'self-government' rights. In August 1989, 
Poland's first non-communist government was established. The new government, recruited 
from 'Solidarnosc', abandoned its former plans for a liberal programme to create a privatised 
market economy. 'Solidarnosc' adopted a new programme of protecting the government's 
reform programme (it started to play a role of a 'protective umbrella' for the reforms). The 
leader of 'Solidarnosc', Lech Walesa, and his close colleagues declared that the reborn 
'Solidarnosc' should not increase its membership, as a large union centre assembling 
industrial workers could hamper the programme of indispensable reforms. This statement 
shocked many workers and, to a certain extent, discouraged them from joining 'Solidarnosc' 
during the first stage of economic and political transformation” (Gardawski, 2002). 
 
As in other European countries, in the years after the fall of communism, Polish trade 
unions experience a sharp decline of union membership, primarily caused by a sharp drop in 
employment in those branches of industry, which traditionally had the highest number of 
trade unionists (mining, metalworking, the machine industry etc). According to Gardawski, 
 12
erosion in Poland has been even more extensive than in other CEE countries. 
“Paradoxically, the great force and authority of the 'Solidarnosc' trade union, which fought 
the previous autocratic regime in order to introduce a market economy and restore 
democracy, has turned out to be a factor which has decreased trade union density among 
Polish workers. At the same time, it has become evident that not only Polish private 
employers, but also the majority of managers, have unfavourable views on trade unions. On 
the other hand, the trade unions themselves have concentrated more on the political aspects 
of their activity (such as reforming the country, supporting ruling coalitions and participating 
in parliamentary elections) than on the trade union aspect. They have let their prestige drop, 
both in the eyes of the workers in general and of their own members” (Gardamski, 2002). 
Table 2 gives an overview of the membership of the most important trade unions in Poland 
in the period 1993-2003.  
 
Table 2 Trade unions in Poland 
 1993 1998 2003  
OPZZ 4,500,000 2,000,000 800,000 -82.2% 
NSZZ 
Solidarność 
2,000,000 1,200,000 780,000 -61.0% 
FZZ - - 320,000 - 
 Source: Carley, 2004 
 
Romania 
As in some other CEE countries, the Romanian trade union movement has long traditions, 
with its official birth being marked by the foundation of the General Association of Workers 
in 1872. When the communist regime was installed after World War II, trade unions 
continued to exist. However, they became part of the apparatus of the ruling party and were 
centralised under the General Union of Trade Unions in Romania (UGSR) (Preda, 2003). In 
the first year after the Ceausescu regime was overthrown, the end of the UGSR monopoly 
lead to a proliferation of new trade unions. It became common to have several trade unions 
with diverging orientations represented in the same company. The introduction of the Trade 
Unions Law in 1991 initiated a process of unifying trade unions into federations and 
confederations. A stronger participation of trade unions in decision-making process in 
general also occurred, including on matters of major importance for the future of the 
economy and society as a whole. (Preda, 2003).  
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In the late 1990’s and early 200’s Romanian trade unions are confronted with declining 
memberships, partly caused by a general trend seen in all countries, partly because of the 
failure to contribute to the solution of the problems of Romanian economy, of which low 
living standards are the most prominent. Table 3 illustrates the membership developments of 
trade unions in Romania.  
 
Table 3 Trade unions in Romania 
 1993 1998 2003 Change 1993-2003 
Meridian 40,000 450,000 1,500,000 +3,650.0% 
Cartel Alfa 1,200,000 1,100,000 1,000,000 -16.7% 
CNSLR 1,284,000 856,000 798,000 -37.9% 
CSDR 650,000 650,000 650,000 0 
BNS nd nd 421,000 - 
Others 150,000 40,000 30,000 -80.0% 
 
Slovenia 
In Slovenia, trade unions and industrial relations began to develop quite early, at the 
beginning of the process of industrialisation. This process in Slovenia was stronger and 
began earlier than elsewhere in the area which made up the former Yugoslavia. At the 
beginning, trade unions had an educational and ‘self-help’ character, but they quickly took on 
a proper trade union role by fighting for better wages and working conditions. After the First 
World War and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire, Slovenia became part of the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The trade unions kept their position and developed further. 
(Skledar, 2002). 
 
After the second World War, democratic trade unions ceased to exist in Slovenia, which was 
now part of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav trade union 
movement was not independent from the party, the state, and managers. It was organized in 
a centralised way, with mandatory membership. However, it is important to note that the 
former Yugoslavia was never part of the eastern bloc (Comecon, Warsaw Pact). Moreover, 
Slovenia was relatively independent from Belgrade (Skledar, 2002). As a consequence, firms 
were more independent than in other countries, and from the 1960’s, the Slovene trade 
union organization (which was a decentralized department of the Yugoslav trade union 
organization) had some autonomy and had contacts with trade unions from neighboring 
countries. As a sign of the growing autonomy and power of the trade union, in the second 
half of the 1980’s some large-scale strikes occurred. After the period of trade union 
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‘unitarism’ under the socialist regime, in the early 1990’s trade union pluralism began to 
develop. In 2002, the Union of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia (ZSSS) is the largest trade 
union by far. It is a reformed organization, originating in the Slovene section of the former 
Yugoslav trade unions. It leans to the left of the political spectrum, and represents almost 
half of trade union members (EIRO, 2004; Skledar, 2002). KNSS (Independence, 
Confederation of New Trade Unions of Slovenia) represents about 10% of the labour 
unions. It was set up since the change of regime, and operates on the right of the political 
spectrum. In 2002 there were several other, smaller trade unions, some of which were split 
from ZSSS. No data are available for the period before 2003, but membership of Slovenia 
trade unions in 2003 is presented in table 4. 
 
Table 4 Trade unions in Slovenia 
 2003 
ZSSS 180,000 
KNSS 15,000 
Pergam 15,000 
Konfederacija '90 10,000 
Others 140,000 
Source: Carley, 2004 
 
 
4.2 Union density in seven CEE Countries 
As in other countries, union density shows a declining trend in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe as well. From a virtual 100% under the communist regimes, union density 
has dropped dramatically. However, we still can observe quite some variation between the 
CEE countries as well. According to Svejnar (2002), average union density in the CEE 
countries is estimated at 49%, which is somewhat higher than the EU average of 44 percent 
and the OECD average of 40%.   
 
As we can see from table 5, since 1990 the number of trade-union members in the post-
communist states have fallen considerably, despite – as we saw in the above section – the 
reform of the former Communist employee associations and the founding of new trade 
unions. The primary explanation for this is the revocation of the usual obligation in 
communist countries to belong to a union. The increasing level of unemployment also serves 
as an explanation for this (Funk and Lesch, 2004).  
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Table 5 Union density in seven CEE countries 
 1990 1 1995 1 2002 2
Bulgaria 61,9 % 
(1991) 
51, 4 % 
(1993) 
20-29 % 4
Croatia   47 % 6
Czech 
Republic 
76,8 % 
 
36,3 % 30,0 % 3
Moldova   38 % 7
(2000) 
Poland  47, 1 % 
(1989) 
27,0 % 15,0 % 3
Romania 50,7 % 
(1991) 
40,7 % 
(1993) 
44 % 5
Slovenia   41,3 % 3
 
1. Source: (ILO, 1997). Union membership as a percentage of non-agricultural labour force. 
2. These figures are considered as rough indicators because of methodological problems. These figures are 
based on national data and may be based on different definitions in terms of the union members included 
(eg whether or not retired or inactive members are counted) and the measure of employment used (Carley, 
2003)). 
3. Source: (Carley, 2003).  
4. Source: (EIRO, 2004) 
5. Source: (EIRO, 2003) 
6. Source: (Petrovic, 2002) 
7. Estimation based on (Munteanu, 2002).  
 
4.3 Institutional position of trade unions 
 
The institutional position of trade unions on the one hand depends on the constellation of 
trade unions and business association in a specific country, and the formal position regarding 
collective bargaining and social dialogue. In section 4.1 I have described the development 
and current situation of trade unions in the seven CEE countries that take a central place in 
this paper. In table 6 the number of trade unions and employers’ associations is presented. 
As we saw in section 3, in general we could argue that fragmented systems of industrial 
relations tend to lead to higher wages and higher welfare expenditures because this limits the 
possibilities of trade-offs. However, the ideological distance between trade unions and 
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employers’ associations within a country are important as well, because this too can prevent 
the creation of central agreements.   
 
Table 6 Number of trade unions in 7 CEE countries 
 Number of the most important 
Country1 Trade unions Employers’ associations
Bulgaria 2 2
Croatia  
Czech 
Republic 
5 2
Moldova 2 
Poland  2 2
Romania 5 8
Slovenia 4 2
Sources: (Carley, 2003; Funk and Lesch, 2004) 
 
In addition to the constellation of trade unions and employers’ organizations, the 
institutional framework in which negotiations take place also is of crucial importance for  the 
role labor unions play in welfare reform. Commonly, wage bargaining level and the coverage 
of collective agreements are considered as indicators for the institutional position of the 
labor movement that affect labor unions’ possibilities to influence welfare reform. Table 7 
illustrates the bargaining levels and number of employees covered by collective agreements in 
the seven countries.     
 
Table 7 Wage bargaining levels in seven CEE countries 
 Importance of wage bargaining level 
 Inter-sectoral  Sectoral Company 
Employees covered by 
collective agreement 
Bulgaria None weak dominant 40 
Croatia     
Czech 
Republic 
None weak dominant 25-30 
Moldova     
Poland  None weak dominant 40 
Romania None weak dominant  
Slovenia Dominant important weak 100 
Source: (Funk and Lesch, 2004) 
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5. Wage developments 
 
In order to be able to confirm or reject the assumptions on the relation between ltrade 
unions’ positions, wage developments and welfare state development, in the remaining part 
of this paper I will focus on wage development and welfare reform. Figure 1 shows the wage 
deleopment in the seven CEE countries. THese indexed wage developments illustrate the 
common development of wages in the CEE countries: after the fall of the communist 
regimes in 1990, all countries have experienced a decrease in real wages. In the more 
succesful countries, this decline came to an end in the second half of the 1990’s, whereas the 
wage levels in Romania, Bulgaria and Moldova are still way below the level of 1990. For 
Croatia, data are only available from 1995. The fact that 1995 is the index year for Croatia 
largely explains the apparently spectacular real wage developments in Croatia, as 1995 was 
the bottom year for most CEE countries. 
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Figure 1 Wage developments 
Source: Unicef Transmonee Database, 2004 
 
Although figure 1 only provides a rough description of real wage developments in the seven 
CEE countries, it can be helpful in assessing the hypotheses that have been developed in 
section three. It shows that wage increases in Croatia, the Czech Republic and Poland have 
been high in comparison with the other countries, wage developments in Slovenia and 
Romania can be considered as average, whereas wage increases in Moldova and Bulgaria are 
low.  
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 6. Welfare reform in CEE Countries  
 
After we have dealt with the position of labor unions and wage developments in the seven 
CEE countries that take a central position in this paper, in this section I will analyze the 
developments of the welfare state in those countries in recent years. In order to stay close to 
the intentions of this paper – assessing the role of labor unions in welfare reform – I will 
focus on three topics in which interests of government, trade unions and business 
associations tend to diverge considerably: pension age (section 6.1), employers’ and 
employees’ benefits to social insurances (section 6.2) and social expenditures (section 6.3).  
 
6.1 Pension reform 
 
According to Muller (2003), during the decades of socialist rule, retirement schemes in CEE 
countries were organized along similar lines. “The central policy measure was the creation of 
a unified pension scheme integrated to the state budget. (...) As a rule, the legal pension age 
was 60 for men and 55 for women; while the effective retirement age was several years 
lower”. Economic transformations affected the existing pension schemes in CEE countries 
in several ways. Firstly, “price liberalization and the curtailment of subsidies on basic goods 
and services required a shift from indirect to direct transfers, resulting in rising expenditure 
for old-age security. At a later stage, the restructuring of the state-owned enterprises had an 
effect on both the revenue and the expenditure side of public pension schemes”. Disability 
pensions and early retirement benefits were used to counter and disguise the employment 
effects of structural adjustment. Rising costs, an increased number of pensioners and a falling 
number of contributors resulted in a destabilization of pension finances.  
Because of these developments, a reform of the pension system was inevitable. Quite some 
variety in the design of these reforms can be observed, although all reforms share one 
common feature: a move from a universalist-redistributive heritage to strongly differentiated, 
earnins-related benefits, with an emphasis on contributory financing. To be able to compare 
the pension reforms between the seven countries, in this paper I concentrate on pension age. 
Of course the pension age is not the only topic in which reforms can be observed the last 
years. For instance, various post-communist countries have introduced mandatory second 
tier, supplementary pension schemes in addition to the first tier, basic old age protection. 
However, these reforms heavily depend on the way the old pension system was organized. A 
thorough understanding of the policy preferences of trade unions and business associations 
therefore require in-depth knowledge of the pension schemes in the different countries. 
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Moreover, the variety in pension schemes hinders a comparison between countries. The 
topic of retirement age illustrates most clearly the differences between the seven countries.     
 
Table 8 Pension reforms 
Country Pre-reform retirement age Year of 
change 
Final retirement age (year 
when this will be realized) 
 Men Women  Men  Women 
Bulgaria1 60 55 2000 63 (2005) 60 (2009) 
Croatia5 60 55 1998 65 (2008) 60 (2008) 
Czech 
Republic1 
60 53-574 1996 62 (2006) 57-61 (2006) 
Moldova5 60 55 1998 62 57 
Poland1  65 60 19992   
Romania1 62 57 2001 65 (2015) 60 (2015) 
Slovenia1 60 (583) 55 (533) 1999 63 (583) 
(2000) 
61 (583) 
(2000) 
1) Source: (European Commission, 2003) 
2) Statutory retirement age in principle unchanged, but before 1999 there were many exceptions (lower 
retirement ages for specific groups) 
3) Earliest possible age with 40 years of service (for men) or 35 years (for women; after the 1999 reform 38 
years)  
4) Depends on number of children 
5) Source: http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/ 
 
Table 8 shows that all countries have adjusted their pension age except Poland. In Poland, 
retirement age was at the common level of 65 for men already. Of course, it’s not easy to 
draw conclusion on the intensity of this reform only based on this table. However, what is 
striking is that some countries – most strikingly Romania, but also Croatia - have chosen for 
a slow increase of the retirement age to 65, whereas retirement age in other countries stays 
well below the level of 65 that is common in Western Europe. For the sake of the argument, 
we can state that pension age reform in Poland and Croatia have been high, in Romania, 
Bulgaria and Slovenia moderate, and in the Czech Republic and Moldova low to moderate.  
  
6.2 Contributions to social insurance  
As has been stated in the previous section, retirement age of course is just a small topic in 
the wider environment of welfare reform. Therefore, the second topic in this analysis of 
welfare reform focuses on the wider subject of employers’ and employees’ contributions to 
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social insurances. Like the pension age – or perhaps even more than the pension age – the 
issue of employers’ contributions contain a fundamental difference of interest between trade 
unions and employers. It is hard to get track of comparable data for social partners’ 
contributions to social insurances. The data that are most easy to compare cover the 
contributions to old-age benefits, disability benefits and survivor benefits.   
 
Table 9 Employers’ and employees’ contributions to social insurance 
Country1 Employers contributions3 Employee contributions4 
 1999 2002 1999 2002 
Bulgaria 37 % 7,25 % 1% 21,75 % 
Croatia 10,75 % 5,75% 10,75% 13,75 %7 
Czech 
Republic 
19.5 % 6,5 % 19.5 % 6,5 % 
Moldova 38 %5  
30 %6  
29 %5  
30 %6  
1% 1% 
Poland  16,26 % 16,26 % 16,26 % 16,26 % 
Romania 23, 28 or 33 %2 25, 30 or 35%2 5% 11,67 %8 
Slovenia 8,85 % (average) 15,5 % (average) 8,85 % (average) 15,5 % (average) 
1) Source: Social Security Programs Throughout the World, 1999 & 2002 
2) Depending on working conditions 
3) % of payroll 
4) % of earnings 
5) Agriculture and industry 
6) State budget supported organizations 
7) For employers under 50, consists of basic pension (8,75 %) and contribution to individual account (5%). 
For employers over 50, the contribution remains 10,75%.  
8) Source: Ministry of Labor, Romania 
 
To be able to assess the role of trade unions, three situations can be distinguished: a situation 
in which employers’ and employees’ contributions are in balance, a situation in which 
employers’ contributions exceed employees’ contributions, and the opposite situation. In 
2002, in Bulgaria and Croatia employees’ contributions exceed employers’ contributions. In 
Poland and Slovenia, the contributions are in balance, in the remaining countries, employers’ 
contributions exceed employees’ contributions. We could argue that a high level of 
employers’ contributions together with low employee contributions indicates a strong 
position of the trade union, whereas the opposite situation indicates a weak position of trade 
unions.   
 21
6.3 Social expenditures 
 
As we have seen in section 3, several hypotheses can be developed regarding trade unions’ 
positions on social expenditures and wage policy. In this section, I will focus on social 
expenditures. Figure 2 shows the share of (central and local) government expenditures that 
goes to social protection.2 Three categories can be distinguished. The first group are the 
countries with social expenditures (slighlty) above 40%: Poland and Slovenia. The second, 
average group consists of countries with social expenditures between 30 and 40%: Bulgaria, 
Coratia, the Czech Republic and Moldova. Finally, in Romania social expenditures are low.  
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Figure 2 Social expenditures in seven CEE countries 
 
However, we cannot see the level of social expenditures apart from the trend in social 
expenditures, so for a complete picture we need to take into account the underlying trend as 
well. Table 10 gives an overview of the level and trends in social expendtiures in the seven 
CEE countries that take a central place in this paper.  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
2 Note that these percentages refer to governments’ social expenditures as a share of total governments’ 
expenditures. A measure that is commonly used for OECD countries is social expenditures as a share of 
GDP. This measure is not available for most CEE countries. 
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Table10 Level and trends in social expenditures  
 Level Trend 
Bulgaria Average Increasing 
Croatia Average Increasing 
Czech 
Republic 
Average Stabilizing 
Moldova Average Increasing 
Poland  High Increasing after decrease 
Romania Low Slowly increasing 
Slovenia High Stabilizing 
 
 
7.  Analysis  
 
In section 3, the following four hypotheses have been formulated:  
1. The classical compensatory thesis, which assumes moderation of wages and inflation of 
welfare expenditures; 
2. The revised compensatory thesis argues that successful social pacts combine the ability to 
moderate wages and to cut back the welfare state; 
3. The additive thesis considers decreasing welfare expenditures as a by-product of wage 
moderation and thus add to its overall beneficial effects; 
4. The pressure thesis relates the development of the welfare state to the strength of organized 
labor. The general assumption is that welfare expenditures tend to increase with the 
strength of organized labor.  
 
In order to be able to answer the hypotheses that have been formulated in section three, I 
have tried to condensate the information in the previous sections into a few key 
characteristics on the reform in the seven countries. This inevitably leads to a loss of detailed 
information. However, I believe that table 11 in a nutshell represents the characteristics of 
the welfare reforms in the seven countries that have taken a central place in this paper.  
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Table 11 Overview of welfare reforms  
 Bu
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ia 
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tia
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ic 
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Ro
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ia 
Sl
ov
en
ia 
Retirement age 
reform  
Moderate High Low to 
moderate 
Low to 
moderate 
High Moderate Moderate 
Distribution of  
social insurance 
contributions  
Higher 
share for 
employees 
Higher 
sharer for 
employees 
Higher 
share for 
employers 
Higher 
share for 
employers 
Balanced Higher 
share for 
employers 
Balanced 
Social 
expenditures  
Average Average Average Low High Low High 
Trend in social 
expenditures 
Increasing Increasing Stabilizing Increasing Increasing 
after period 
of decline 
Slowly 
increasing 
Stabilizing 
        
Wage 
development 
Low High High Low High Average Average 
 
To be able to draw some conclusion about trade unions’ role in reform processes, we need 
to connect these characteristics to the key characteristics of the trade unions in the seven 
countries. Table 12 gives a short overview of the role and positions of trade unions, based on 
the descriptions in section four.   
 
Table 12 Characteristics of trade unions 
 Dominancy of 
former 
communist 
trade union 
Role of trade 
union(s) in 
overthrowing 
communist 
regime 
Level of 
fragmentation 
Unions density  Institutional 
position  
Bulgaria Yes Yes Low Low Weak 
Croatia    Average  
Czech 
Republic 
Yes No High Low Weak 
Moldova Yes No Low Low  
Poland  No Yes Low Low Weak 
Romania No No High Average Weak 
Slovenia Yes No Low Average Strong 
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At first sight, it’s hard to connect the seven countries with one of the hypotheses. There is a 
wide variety in wage developments, welfare reform processes and institutional position of 
trade unions. Starting with the countries in with wages and wage increases are low, two 
situations are possible. Low wages can be compensated with little or moderate cutbacks of 
the welfare state (hypothesis 1), or low wages and low wage increases can be connected in a 
social pact with intensive reforms of the welfare state (hypotheses 2). Although there is not a 
perfect match, it seems that the two countries with low wage developments – Bulgaria and 
Moldova - are also characterized by moderate cutbacks of the welfare state and increasing 
social expenditures, which fits within the classical compensatory thesis. Also Romania, with 
wage increases on average level, can be said to fit within the classical compensatory thesis.  
Based on the characteristics of trade unions’ roles, we would expect the pressure thesis to 
represent the Slovenian situation. This however is not the case. With stabilizing welfare 
expenditures and average wage increases, Slovenia much better fits within the revised 
compensatory thesis.  
For the other countries, it’s almost impossible to fit them within one the hypotheses. Our 
reform hypotheses have been developed for western countries, apparently they are not 
prepared for situations in which wage levels have fallen dramatically in recent years. What we 
can see in all countries except Slovenia is a minimal position of trade unions in collective 
bargaining and dramatic declines in wages in the last decade. Wage moderations – which play 
a key role in reform processes in most Western European countries – are not yet used as a 
source of power in negotiations on processes of reform. Trade unions’ weak positions in 
wage bargaining in almost all countries prevent this.  
Therefore the first conclusion of this must be that the role of trade unions in processes of 
welfare reform in CEE countries differs significantly from that in other countries, because 
trade unions do not have the power resource of ‘wage moderation’ at their disposal.  
Moreover, trade unions’ weak position in almost all countries make it impossible to attribute 
variations in the processes and intensity of reform to the role and position of trade unions in 
a specific country. A more in-depth analysis of the ideology and strategy of trade unions is 
required to assess the impact of trade unions in reform processes. However, a few 
conclusions can be drawn on the impact trade unions positions. 
Firstly, the reform processes in countries in which the former communist labor organization 
play a central role do not differ significantly of the other countries. The same holds true for 
countries in which an opposition trade union played a central role in overthrowing the 
communist regime. And finally, also the existence of a fragmented system of trade unions 
appear not to lead to significant difference in the reform process. Probably the minimal 
impact of differences in structural characteristics can be traced back to the weak position of 
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trade unions. Therefore, we also do not find ammunition for the critics that trade unions 
prevent welfare reformt.  
 
8.  Reflection 
This paper is the first step in a research project on the impact of European social policy on 
welfare reform in the CEE countries. The role and position of trade unions are domestic 
characteristics that could account for variations in reform processes. This paper shows that 
the trade unions’ weak position in almost every CEE country make it unlikely that trade 
unions characteristics explain variety in reform processes.  
With regard to the more general research question on the impact of European social policy 
on reform processes, a first conclusion is that variety in economic performance and 
admission date explains variations in the intensity and processes of welfare reform to a 
certain level. An important theme in the analysis of European social policy is the issue of 
congruence between EU member states in social policy. Opinions differ on the matter 
whether or not Europeanization leads to congruence in social policies. With regard to this 
topic, a distinction must be made between direct influence from Brussels through European 
directions and guidelines, and indirect influence from Brussels. In a further stage of this 
project, I will focus on this influence from Brussels. For the moment however, at first sight 
we can conclude that social policies in the countries of which the economic performance and 
general life standard differ most from the EU average, seem to converge to the level of the 
other CEE countries. In-depth analysis of the reform processes is required to assess this 
thesis, but it could mean a contribution to the continuing dispute in literature on the causes 
of welfare reform.  
Although there is no formal social policy at the European level, some initiatives that are 
based on the Lisbon Agenda in which the EU formulated the strategic goal of becoming the 
most competitive economy in the world while safeguarding an acceptable level of social 
protection, have significant impact on the development of European social policy. One of 
the examples of this is the required involvement of social partners in developing National 
Action Plans on Employment Policy. Without doubt, this will lead to an improvement of 
trade unions positions in the countries that are or will become EU member states.   
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